Bodhi-Path Year 2022 January Issue Volume 22 Page No 69-77

Reality is Experiential: A Buddhist Analysis

Dr. Ramala Sarma
Assistant Professor
Department Of Philosophy
Nowgong College (Autonomous)
Nagaon: Assam

Abstract

The present work is a humble attempt to explore the experiential nature of reality in Buddhism through a brief analysis of the views of reality expounded by different Buddhist schools, particularly the early Buddhism, Yogacara, and the Madhyamaka. Reality in early Buddhism is the passing phenomena with no underlying essence yet connected by a causal principle. Understanding it and getting rid of the tendency of mistaking ephemeral things for eternal is Nirvana. For the Yogācāra, reality is cittamātra that denies the existence of any worldly phenomena outside consciousness. The Mādhyamaka śūnyavāda espouses the intrinsic emptiness of all phenomena— mental and physical. Finally, the paper tries to establish that in the Buddhist enterprise of reality, there is hardly any space between reality and experiencing reality. Hence the attempt to describe reality through language seems futile. Under the veil of differences in adopting methods and thus using different words/languages to delineate reality, there seems an unuttered consensus among the Buddhist thinkers regarding the notion that reality is experiential.

Keywords: Buddhism, reality, early Buddhism, Yogācāra, Mādhyamaka, experiential reality

Introduction

The concept of reality in Buddhist history shows that it has got along different stages. From the systematic cultivation of mind for attaining Nirvāna to the heated debate of reality as mind-only or name-only, the discussion of reality has traversed a long way. Early Buddhism was not much interested in discussion of metaphysical questions like reality and the language to interpret it. The words or names used in that time were only to teach the dhamma to the people. Early Buddhism was a very simple teaching, a teaching on alleviation of suffering. If we look at the origin of Buddhism, we'll see suffering at its root. It is human suffering that led Prince Siddhartha Gautama to leave his princely life. At the unpleasant sight (Buddhacarita, Canto III) of oldness, sickness, and death when he felt that what we see and experience is not the real nature of things, he gave up (Buddhacarita, Canto:V) his royal life for a greater purpose of seeking truth or reality. After his six years of rigorous meditation with his supersharp concentration, he found Four Noble Truths including the theory of Dependent Arising. This theory was evolved into a full-blown twelve factors of Dependent Origination or Paticcasamuppāda. If one wants to be enlightened all one needs to realize is that desire is the root cause of suffering which appears in the middle part of the Paticcasamuppāda. It is as simple as that. But Buddhism evolved in several stages. It lost its significance as a way of life and practice and inflated into a hair-splitting logic and philosophy. Later Buddhism, split up into many schools, is more concerned about a reality below the level we can perceive thereby getting more argumentative than needed. Here, however, the paper will discuss reality in three phases of Buddhism, viz., i) early Buddhism which will include Abhidhammic school (to avoid redundancy), ii) Yogācāra, and iii) Mādhyamaka and will explain that the reality can be experienced rather than be interpreted by language.

Early Buddhism: Reality is dependent arising without a permanent self

Being a fully enlightened person with a complete purification of mind and perfect wisdom, the Buddha's function concerning humanity is that of a teacher— a world teacher who shows others the path to Nirvāna, the final release from suffering. His teaching, popularly known as Dhamma, consists of a set of instructions that explains the true nature of existence and the way to liberation. It is founded solidly upon the base of his clear understanding of reality and it leads one who practices it to that same knowledge— the knowledge which removes the roots of suffering. The theoretical framework of the Buddha's view of reality can be said to be provided by the Four Noble Truths. These four truths, which center around the fact of suffering, are not merely understood as the human experiences of pain and miseries, but as the pervasive unsatisfactoriness of everything conditioned. The Dhammapada (15:203) said, "Hunger is the worst disease, conditioned things the worst suffering. Knowing this as it really is, the wise realize Nibbana, the highest bliss". The first Noble Truth declares that ultimately all constituent phenomena of body and mind (khandha) are impermanent and non-substantial and hence are intrinsically unsatisfactory. In the second, third, and fourth Noble Truths, the Buddha declares the cause, cessation, and the way to the cessation of suffering respectively. In the second truth where he declares the cause of suffering as desire Buddhism has recourse to metaphysical speculations along with the psychological one. There is sorrow because we desire things that are impermanent and changeable. It is the ephemeral nature of the things that causes discontent and remorse. All conditioned things are unsatisfactory (Dhammapada, 20:278). He said that in this world, three things are not real, viz., that which is beyond decay and death, that which is not impermanent, and that possesses self-essence. Stating everything as impermanent, the Buddha said if by self or atman it means any substantial reality, then there is no self. 'All things (Dharma) are not-self' (Dhammapada, 20:279). What we call self is a succession of empty shows. Hence the notion of 'I' or the permanent self is false. This false notion is at the root of human suffering. Due to this 'I' or ego, the division of the self and the other ensues. So conflicts ensue and eventually, sufferings. To put in the words of Walpola Rahula (1959), "the idea of the self is an imaginary, false belief which has not corresponding reality, and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine', selfish desire, craving, attachments, hatred, ill-will, conceit, pride, egoism and other defilements, impurities and problems.… In short to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world" (p.51).

There is not a permanent entity that could be identified as "I". Whatever we have is an everchanging phenomenon within our mind/body mechanism called consciousness (Dhammadassi Bhikkhu and Gunatunge, 2010; p.280). Consciousness is not a permanent entity residing somewhere in the person. For it takes different forms depending on the way we receive inputs from our sensory organs. Hence, consciousness is constantly arising and ceasing, forming a stream of events. Western thinkers like Hume and William James also upheld the similar view. For Hume, the self is a bundle of perceptions and hence the concept of personal identity is fictitious. William James also said that the self is just a stream of consciousness. Then the Buddha's rejection of the 'I' is not a rejection of the conventional term 'I'. It remains there as a name. What he rejects is the 'I' that represents a substantial, independent, permanent, and eternal reality. Individuality is an amalgamation of phenomena that appear to form the psycho-physical continuum of an individual life. The Buddha said that any being in its totality or mind/body mechanism consists of Paramātta Dhammas or ultimate things that are not reducible into any parts. They are 89 cittas (mind), 52 cetāsikas (mental factors), and 28 types of physical things. The Buddha also included Nirvāna in Paramāttā Dhamma and hence there are four kinds of ultimate stuff of every being (Abhidhamma 1: 2). This collection of Paramāttā Dhamma is called the Whole. It consists of five essential groups called panchkhandhas or five aggregates, viz., form or rupa, sensation or feeling or vedanā, perception or samjnā, mental formations or samskaras, consciousness or vijñāna. The form is

the physical world. The sensation is our simplest response to experience, viz., pleasure, displeasure, or indifference. The function of perception is to turn an indefinite experience into an identified and recognized experience. Mental formations, which are volitional mental actions, determine our responses to the objects of experience. And these responses have moral consequences in the sense of wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral. Consciousness is an indispensable element in the production of experience. Without consciousness, the sense organ and the object cannot produce experience. For example, when the eyes, the visible object, and consciousness come together, the experience of a visible object is produced. Each and all of the aggregates are in constant change. So are the things around us. They are processes, not things. The Buddha said, "The body, O monks, is not the Self. Sensation is not the Self. Perception is not the Self. The mental constructions are not the Self. And neither is consciousness the Self. Perceiving this, O monks, the disciple sets no value on the body, or on sensation, or on perception, or on mental constructions, or on consciousness. Setting no value on them, he becomes free of passions and he is liberated. The knowledge of liberation arises there within him. And then he knows that he has done what has to be done, that he has lived the holy life, that he is no longer becoming this or that, that his rebirth is destroyed" (Anāttā-Lakkhana Sutta, SN 22:59). What follows from it is that all the factors that make up our experience are ever-changing, subject to conditions, ungraspable, and impermanent, therefore giving rise to suffering. And a 'soul' or 'individuality' or 'personality' cannot be found in any of them. And mistaking impermanent things for the perpetual self is the cause of suffering. Matthieu Ricard (2001) says, "To assume a substrate beneath appearance may seem rational, but it mostly rests upon an ingrained and unexamined habit that is not only a fundamental misapprehension of reality, but is also the source of frustration and misery" (p.113-114).

In the Buddha's teaching, life is not viewed as an isolated occurrence beginning spontaneously with birth and ending in utter annihilation at death. Each single life span is seen, rather, as part of an individualized series of lives having no discoverable beginning in time and continuing so long as there is a desire for existence or 'will-to-live' in the words of Schopenhauer (Nanajivako, 1988; p.80). We think 'I' to be the controller of the mind/body mechanism. But the truth is that a lot of this process goes autonomously. "I" does not always contribute to the mind/body mechanism to function. Mind/body mechanism runs automatically without "I" in many bodily functions like breathing, blood circulation, and fighting germs, etc. (Dhammadassi Bhikkhu & Gunatunge, 2010; p.264-265). When certain conditions occur, our consciousness arises with an appropriate body in a suitable plane. Again, with the rise of certain causes, we function through our six senses, we formulate knowledge, judgements, and beliefs, etc based on the information gained through senses. This is how our life begins and sustains. Thus, mind and body are intertwined and interdependent entities that are bound together for their existence and survival. And like the body that decomposes or changes every moment with the variation in the intensities of the great essentials, the mind too arises, exists, and ceases as discrete units within less than a billionth of a second. The living universe is a reflection of our mind where every single phenomenon is a link in the chain, a momentary phase of evolution. Hence reality cannot be regarded as 'is' or 'is not'. Reality is the middle point that avoids extremes. It is becoming without a beginning or an end. The identity of objects is an unreality. We form a seemingly unchanging universe out of conditions and relations. These relations are not necessary but contingent. They are not true of things in themselves. They operate only in our world of phenomena. Hence, this tells us a story that the ultimate realities are not stand-alone entities but a host of interdependent energies that synergize the formation of the world as it appears to us. Even the four basic elements, viz. earth, water, fire, and air are, in fact, not elements in the strict context of elements. The Buddha did not want to tell us any ontology of elements as such but

wanted to perceive our experiences as to how we feel them. That is, the world we perceive is perceived as solids, liquids, gases, and raw calorific energy. That too is to be understood only so far as that understanding leads us to the cessation of suffering.

The Buddha offers the law of causation to account for the continuity of the world in the absence of a permanent substratum. Existence is a transformation where everything is an event in a series of successive states. It is a force, a cause, a condition which the Buddha called Dhamma. It follows the causal formula "that being present, this becomes; from the arising of that, this arises. That being absent, this does not become; from the cessation of that, this ceases" (Majjhimā Nikāya, ii 32). That which constitutes being in the material realm of things is only dependent arising or Paticcasamuppāda. "They arise, or exist, only so far as they are efficient, that is to say, so far they themselves are causes. Whatsoever exists is a cause, cause and existence are synonymous" (Stcherbatsky, 1949; Vol-1, p.119). The essence of a thing lies in its inherent law of the relation. There is no being that changes. There is only self-changing. The world-process is of the kind of a self-acting development. Hence the Buddha's causal evolution cannot be looked at as a mechanical succession of movements that defines the world-process as a series of exterminations and new creations. Rather it is transitive causation where one state transmits its causal potency to some new conceived seed. This capacity to produce some change in the order of things is not present in any permanent thing. If they were unchanged for all time, there is no reason why they should cause different effects at different times. This supports the Buddha's view of the impermanent nature of non-mental reality. However, he clearly distinguishes between the momentariness of consciousness and the impermanence of things. The duration of the physical things may vary depending upon their nature. But the mind or consciousness is always fleeting. It lasts for a moment only. It is often explained in the Buddhist text with the analogy of the flame of a lamp each of which lasts only an instant.

However, though there is no underlying reality and hence no controller, the universe does not run unplanned. The Buddha speaks about five Niyamas (Ledi Sayadaw, n.d.) or the processes, viz. Utu-niyama or the natural law of non-living matter, Bija-niyama or germinal order, Kamma-niyama or the order of moral causation, citta-niyama or the order of psychogenesis, and Dhamma-niyama or the natural order of things. Hence, unlike Bergsonian life which is beyond the law, life according to the Buddha is an illustration of general law. Then, the Buddha does not find any centre of reality in the whirl of life and the world. He simply accepts the facts of experience. Here the only reality is the law of change, i.e., causality. This causality has evolved into twelve factors in the world of sentient existence. These twelve factors are successive causes where each one conditions the next and at the root of the link lies ignorance. Through this causal nexus, it is shown that vijñāna or the consciousness of "I" does not reside in any permanent soul. Rather is a continuous phenomenon arising by way of a causal formula. This explains the Buddha's idea contained in the second and third Noble Truths. That the individuality that we attach ourselves to is only a form or an empty appearance elicited by ignorance. The individuality or "I" that creates illusion is itself an illusion. "Individuality is the symptom as well the disease" (Radhakrishnan, 1996; p.415). "I" = limitation = ignorance. Then, what one is ignorant of? According to early Buddhism, it is the true nature of "I", suffering, and the Four Noble Truths.

Yogācāra: Reality is Mind-only or cittamātra

Yogācāra takes an idealist stand in its view of reality. For this school of thought, what is, is simply one homogeneous vijñāna. It is not an abstract but a concrete reality. Vijñāna is the substratum for all the entities— seeming reality or imaginary. There is no external world without thought. Reality is mind-only or cittamātra. In Vimsatikākārikāvṛtti, Vāsubandhu

puts forward the argument that cognitive objects have existence only in consciousness, for nothing can be apprehended without consciousness. This means that for the appearance of the objects what is required is consciousness, not external objects. External objects are nothing but mental projections. Lankāvatāra Sutra (Ch 2, VIII: 128) says, "Analysed down to atoms, there is indeed no form to be discriminated as such; what can be established is the [truth of] Mind-only, which is not believed by those who cherish erroneous views". Only the mind exists and not the physical objects. Through the objects visually cognized mind manifests itself in body, in one's daily life. Yogācāras call it the Alaya of men. Vāsubandhu denies the existence of indivisible material atoms and composite whole (Vimsatikākārikāvṛtti, 11-14), and compares the perception of external entities to the dream experiences in which a fabricated world is fashioned by the mind and is deceitfully believed to be real. In reply to the realist question why external objects are perceived in space and time, Vāsubandhu said that even the non-existent objects are presented to us, in the same manner, a visually impaired person sees things like hair, bees, etc when they are not present before him (Vimsatikākārikāvṛtti 1). The fact that the external world is experienced the same by the individuals is due to the growth of similar karmic seeds in their consciousnesses leading to a common hallucination. Vāsubandhu explains this position with the help of eight consciousnesses, particularly Ālayavijñāna, three natures exposition, and five-step path to enlightenment. Here, however, Ālayavijñāna will be discussed mainly and the others will be taken up only as an aid to the main discussion.

Though Yogācāras differ from the early Buddhist thought in certain respects, they agree with the later on the basic teachings of the Buddha, the Four Noble Truths being the key teaching. The theory of Ālayavijñāna of the idealist Yogācāra or Vijñānavādin can be said to be supplementary to the theory of early Buddhism. Early Buddhism and Sarvāstivādins relied on karma in exploring the mystery of the phenomena. But they stopped there without giving an adequate account of the vicious cycle of our past actions, the forms of consciousness these actions result in, and the afflictive actions they produce, which again lead to more karmic formations and forms of consciousness, and so on. And in some situations, like memory, deep sleep, unconsciousness, and certain meditative conditions, they found it difficult to explain within the framework of their system. Again, the early Buddhist had to face the oft-raised question: if there is no enduring self, who will experience these karmic effects? Yogācāra came up to fill this vacuum with the theory of Ālayavijñāna or storehouse consciousness as developed by Asanga and Vāsubandhu (Sogen, 1912, p.211). Waldron, (2002) states, "Indeed, one of the rationales of the ālaya-vijñāna was that— given this particular notion of selflessness— only it could account for the continuity of karmic influences" (p.19). Through Ālayavijñāna ('ālaya' means 'depository of all germs or seeds'), Vāsubandhu explains that the seed of the past experience is deposited subliminally and transmuted into a new one. Ālayavijñāna is a series of continuous consciousness which, in the modern psychological term, is called a stream of consciousness. The Ālaya concept may remind us of the Atman of the Indian Vedic schools. Then unlike the immutable Ātman, Ālaya is changing. As Yogācāra accepts the basic Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, seeds are said to last only for a moment during which they become the cause of a similar seed. Wholesome karmic acts beget wholesome effects and unwholesome karmic acts produce unwholesome effects. In this way, momentary seeds are causally linked in the chain of karmic causes and effects. The sāśrava bija or unwholesome seed is an acquired cognitive habit that prevents one from attaining enlightenment. It binds one to Samsara. Anāśrava bija or wholesome seed, on the other hand, produces more pure seeds leading one to enlightenment. The first kind of seeds represents the first two Noble Truths, while the other kind represents the last two Noble Truths. Thus, Ālayavijñāna is the possibility of both

samsara and Nirvāna. Now, in which realm one would remain will be determined by his karma.

As per the three-natures exposition, there are three cognitive realms: the delusional cognitively constructed realm (parikalpita) in which the individual considers the external objects to be real and existing in themselves; the realm of causal dependency (paratantra) in which consciousness is perceived as a stream of the causally connected event; and the perfectional realm (parinispanna) in which non-duality is realised in the perfect insight of the enlightened person who conceives dependent aspect as it really is (suchness or tathatā), as a flow of consciousness not divided into subject and object. In this system of thought, Buddhism is a way of cleansing the stream of consciousness from defilements and impurities. Hence, Yogācāra prescribes the practice of yoga which helps attain intuitive insight. They say that metaphysical truth requires yogic discipline. When the mind is free from delusion, it reflects truth or Nirvāna. It is attained through five steps, viz., provisioning (sambhārāvasthā), experimental (prayogāvasthā), deepening understanding (prativedhāvasthā), the Path of Cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga), and final stage (nisthāvasthā).

Mādhyamaka: Reality is Śūnya or name-only or nāmmātra

Though the thoughts of Mādhyamaka tradition and hence of Nāgārjuna are variously interpreted by the academics and the Buddhist schools themselves, a minute study of Nāgārjuna reveals that his concepts of śūnya (the empty), paticcasamuppāda (dependent origination), and madhyamā pratipad (middle way) are different names for the same thing (Kalupahana, p.339-340). These three concepts expose his view of reality. Śūnya means that all things—physical and mental— are empty of independent existence or absoluteness (svabhāva) because they depend on other things as their causes and conditions. As the nature of the world is an evolving process, we cannot admit the absolute reality. For Nāgārjuna, substance (svabhāva) is non-evident, for it is not dependently arisen and a thing which is not dependently arisen is not evident (The Mādhyamika Sastra, XXIV:16; Kalupahana, p.341). Self-nature or self-essence is not something that comes and goes. It is there eternally. Hence, it opposes the theory of emptiness which is envisioned to explain the occurrence of things. For, if any entity possesses its self-essence, it can neither be produced nor annihilated. It is independent of causes and conditions. But a thing is an aggregate of dhammas which are moments in a continuous series. Likewise, an individual is an aggregate of mental and physical dhammas. Apart from these dhammas, all things including humans have only existence of designation (nāmmātra). Nothing exists by itself. Everything arises depending upon other things. Here surfaces another meaning of śūnya, that is, the dependent arising. This understanding of śūnya as dependent arising has a comprehensive implication of how we interact with the world. In chapter 26 of Mulamādhyamaka Kārikā, Nāgārjuna states that human suffering is ceased with the removal of ignorance by the right understanding of non-substantiality of things and that with the cessation of one link of dependent origination, the other link will not take place. What Nāgārjuna claims here, as Westerhoff (2009, Ch 2.2) explains, is that with the realization of the absence of substance-svabhāva, the first link, ignorance, of the twelve links of dependent origination, which constitutes the central Buddhist theory of the generation of the cognitive constitution of the human mind, will cease to exist. Nāgārjuna's concept of reality is neither an extreme nihilism nor extreme eternalism. His ontological middle way asserts that everything exists, but nothing exists more than conventionally. As the entities exist (at least for one moment) conventionally, we cannot say that they are non-existent. But as they are not permanent, we cannot say that they are eternally existent. Thus, we can say that the Mādhyamaka school admitted two levels of reality: one conventional (samvṛti) and the other ultimate (paramārtha). Conventional reality

describes our experience of the phenomenal world, while the ultimate reality is the absence of the inherent existence of all things.

Conclusion: Reality is better experienced rather than be grasped linguistically

From the foregoing discussion, it can be said the ultimate reality in early Buddhism is Nirvāna which is attained by extinguishing desire with the realisation of the absence of intrinsic nature of the worldly phenomena. In Yogācāra, consciousness is the only reality and the highest cognitive realm, viz., parinispanna, is when the entities are recognised as mere concepts with no being in themselves. For Mādhyamaka, the reality is devoid of self-essence (śūnya). What we know is only a conventional truth. Here Nāgārjuna upholds almost the same view as early Buddhism. His treatment of śūnya, dependent origination, and middle path as synonymous affirms it. Hence, it is often said that Nāgārjuna has put the old wine in a new bottle. Again, Yogācāra's prescription of yogic discipline as an aid to intuitive insight for realising metaphysical truth hints to the point that they too are not far away from the early Buddhist position. The common element that one may extract from the views of these three Buddhist systems is that the referent in the reality-discourse is not objective. It is subjective; it is there in the individual. The Buddha said one has to see and test for himself (ehipāssiko) the dhamma, the ultimate reality. Here the journey is experiential, contemplative, and transformational.

When it is contemplative and experiential, its objective description gets less importance. And hence word/language seems to play a small role here. A language is a tool we use to express our experiences as they are felt by us. The substantialists fall back upon language to describe phenomena. The substantialist view violates the Buddhist principle that phenomena are empty of intrinsic nature and hence are beyond the sign. That which is dynamic and sign-less is indescribable. The Abhidhamma does not admit the reality of word/language. For "The primary concern of the Abhidhamma is to understand the nature of experience, and thus the reality on which it focuses is conscious reality, the world as given in experience, comprising both knowledge and the known in the widest sense" (Bodhi, 2016; p.4). When Prince Siddhartha attained Buddhahood under the Bodhi Tree, what he saw was only a heightened experience of the interplay of energies. Initially, he had doubts if others could understand this experience that was devoid of any language. He did eventually as best as he could by using a common language at his time. Yogācāra and Mādhyamika also deny the reality of language. They only attach a status of conventional truth to words, concepts, and signs. Language may play a significant role in describing theoretical knowledge in an objective way in fundamental science. Then even science, however modern it may be, still cannot describe some aspects of nature in an unbiased way, say, for example, energy. Science will tell us what energy does or how it behaves but not what they are or why they are there in the first place. To stress how language can mislead us, I would like to quote David Bohm (2002), an American Theoretical Physicist, "The subject-verb-object structure of language, along with its world view, tends to impose itself very strongly in our speech, even in those cases in which some attention would reveal its evident inappropriateness. For example, consider the sentence "It is raining". Where is the 'It' that would, according to the sentence, be 'the rainer that is doing the raining'? Clearly, it is more accurate to say: "Rain is going on". Similarly, we customarily say, 'One elementary particle acts on another', but…… each particle is only an abstraction of a relatively invariant form of movement in the whole field of the universe. So it would be more appropriate to say, 'Elementary particles are on-going movements that are mutually dependent because ultimately they merge and interpenetrate'" (p.37). Even a Buddha, however omniscient he may be, would not tell us what energy is but only tell us the story of the evolution of energy culminating in the human species and a practical way to dissolve this energy in a dependent cycle of becoming. That

the use of language is prone to misinterpretation and confusion was also demonstrated in the early Buddhist texts and the later works of interpretation of Buddhism. The Buddha's silence to the ten questions (Majjhima Nikāya, 63 & 72) may be said to be a shred of evidence for it. Dhammadassi Bhikkhu & Gunatunge (2010) put, "There is nothing in a language one can identify as absolute. The words and the sentences constructed using a language may carry meanings which are totally wrong in any absolute sense" (p. 273). We need language in cognising, conceptualising, and understanding the world around us. But if we become a slave to the meanings already formed in a language, it would be a serious problem when new findings come our way. Hence the Buddha had to rely on "experiential understanding" (Dhammadassi Bhikkhu & Gunatunge 2010; p.274) which would give us a meaning without depending on any other accepted views, right or wrong. Again, Buddhism is a contemplative science as Ricard Matthieu (2001) would call it. And in a contemplative science like Buddhism where reality means liberating knowledge, any theory regarding reality is of little use. "Buddhist philosophy and contemplation do not set out to construct a grandiose theoretical edifice. But what they do insist on are tangible results in terms of inner transformation" (Ricard. 2001; p.272).

References:

- Anacker, S. (trans.) (2005), Seven Works of Vasubandhu. The Buddhist Psychological Doctor. Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass. [includes translations and commentaries of Vimsatikākārikāvṛtti in Chapter VI]
- Bodhi, Bhikkhu (revised trans.) (2016). A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma. Anuruddha, A. (original trans.) The Abhidhamma Sangaha. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society
- Bohm, D. (2002). Wholeness and the Implicate Order. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul
- Buddharakkhita, Acharya (trans.) (2014). The Dhammapada. Bangalore, India: Mahabodhi Society of Bangalore
- Dhammadassi Bhikkhu, N. & Gunatunge, K. B. (2010). What is Reality. Pitakotte, Sri Lanka: Authors
- Johnston, E. H. (trans.) (1936). The Buddhacarita. Kolkata, India: Baptist Mission Press
- Kalupahana, D. J. (1999). Mulamādhyamakakārikā of Nagarjuna. New Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited
- Ledi Sayadaw, Mahathera. The Niyama-Dipani: *The Manual of Cosmic Order*. ttps://mahajana.net/texts/manual04.html Accessed 12.8.2021.
- Nanajivako, Bhikkhu (1988). Schopenhauer and Buddhism. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Radhakrishnan, S. (1996). Indian Philosophy Vol. I. Delhi, India: Oxford University Press
- Rahula, W. (1959). What the Buddha Thought. New York, USA: Grove Press
- Ricard, M. and Thuan, T. X. (2001). The Quantum and The Lotus. New York, USA: Three Rivers Press
- Sayadaw, The Ven. Mahasi (2013). A Discourse on The Anatta Lakkhana Sutta. Myanmar: The Socialist Republic of Burma
- Sogen, Y. (1912). Systems of Buddhistic Thought (PDF). Kolkata, India: University of Calcutta. Retrieved https://library.um.edu.mo/ebooks/b32295509.pdf Ch VI
- Stcherbatsky, Th. (2008). Buddhist Logic Vol. 1. Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers Private Limited

- Sujuki, D. T. (Trans.) (2005). The Lankavatara Sutra (PDF). Retrieved http://www.buddhistische-gesellschaft-berlin.de/downloads/lankavatarasutrasuzuki.pdf
- Waldron, William S. (2002). The Buddhist Unconscious (PDF). London: RoutledgeCurzon. Retrieved http://abhidharma.ru/A/Raznoe/0061.pdf p.140-142
- Westerhoff, J. (2009) Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka (PDF). New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved https://www.academia.edu/24714847/N%C4%81g%C4%81rjunas_Madhyamaka_A_Philosophical_Introduction_By_Jan_Westerhoff

……..